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TORTS - INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY - MARYLAND ABROGATES INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN CASES OF OUTRAGEOUS INTENTIONAL TORTS. LUSBY v. LUSBY, 283 Md. 334, 390
A.2d 77 (1978).
In Lusby v. Lusby, l the Court of Appeals of Maryland modified
the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity by allowing
a wife's action against her husband for an outrageous intentional
tort. With this decision Maryland joins an increasing number of
jurisdictions that have either limited or abolished tort immunity
between spouses. 2 Unlike many states that have abolished interspousal immunity in all tort cases,3 and others that have abrogated it
in negligence 4 or intentional tort suits,5 the Maryland court
abrogated the immunity only in those cases involving outrageous
intentional torts.
This Note analyzes the Lusby decision and its impact on
Maryland law and advocates a further abrogation of the immunity
in Maryland for all cases involving intentional torts between
spouses. Particular emphasis is placed on the court of appeals'
abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in light of the recent trend
in other jurisdictions.
I.

LUSBY v. LUSBY - THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Diana Lusby brought a civil action against her husband and his
two companions on charges of assault, battery, rape, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional injury.6 Mrs. Lusby
1. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
2. A majority of states have modified or completely abrogated the immunity. See
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
3. E.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Beaudette v. Frana,
285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969).
4. E.g., Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Richard v. Richard, 131
Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973).
5. E.g., Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973); Bounds v. Caudle, 560
S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
6. Mrs. Lusby prayed for compensatory and punitive damages. Brief for Appellant
at 1, 2, Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
7. The court of appeals did not address the issue of rape. Under Maryland law, a
husband is immune from prosecution for rape of his wife. "A person may not be
prosecuted [for rape] if the victim is the person's legal spouse at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape or sexual offense unless the parties 'are living
separate and apart pursuant to a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 464D (1976). See generally Note, Litigation Between Husband and
Wife, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1650 (1966).
[A] husband is immune from prosecution for rape of his wife .... [I]t is
reasonable in many marital situations to assume actual consent to
intercourse, but the husband's immunity applies even if it is clear that in
fact the wife explicitly refused. Her husband's immunity might in such
cases be said to rest on her irrevocable consent at the time of marriage. It
is doubtful, however, that such an irrevocable consent is generally
anticipated by wives . . . . The absolute privilege therefore appears as
an imposed term of the marital bargain.
Id. at 1663 (emphasis in original).
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alleged that her husband, Gerald Lusby, forced her to engage in
sexual intercourse without her consent, 7 and aided two companions
in sexually assaulting her. Mrs. Lusby charged that while she was
driving her automobile her husband pulled alongside of her in his
truck and pointed a high-powered rifle at her. When she attempted to
flee, another truck driven by her husband's two companions forced
her off the road. Mr. Lusby then took control of his wife's automobile
and drove down the road, followed by his two companions. Shortly
thereafter, Gerald Lusby forced his wife into his truck where he
allegedly struck her, tore her clothes off, and had forced sexual
relations with her. Mr. Lusby then assisted his two companions in
attempting to rape his wife.
Mr. Lusby demurred to the declaration on the grounds that he
was married to Mrs. Lusby at the time of the alleged offense and
that the common law prohibited tort suits between spouses. The
demurrer was overruled8 and Mr. Lusby then filed a preliminary
motion 9 asserting that a wife lacks standing to sue her husband for
a personal tort. The motion was granted and the trial court
dismissed the case. An appeal was filed in the court of special
appeals and, while the case was pending, certiorari was granted by
the court of appeals. 1o
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY

A. The Common Law
The roots of interspousal immunity are buried in the English
common law,ll formulated in an era when the matrimonial act
stripped the wife of certain property rights and suspended her legal
existence. 12 Common law disabilities incident to marriage prevented
8. The demurrer was overruled because nothing on the face of the declaration
established that Diana and Gerald Lusby were husband and wife. Mr. and Mrs.
Lusby were, however, married to each other at the time of the incident. They had
been separated for approximately fourteen months and Mrs. Lusby had filed for
a suit for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. They were subsequently divorced on
April 26, 1976. Brief for Appellant at 3, Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77
(1978).
9. Mr. Lusby filed a motion raising preliminary objection pursuant to Maryland
Rule 323. 283 Md. at 336, 390 A.2d at 78.
10. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 337, 390 A.2d 77, 78 (1978). The court of appeals
granted certiorari prior to oral arguments in the court of special appeals
pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1974).
11. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 306-07 (1877). See generally 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF
TORTS, Ch. 23 § 8.10 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030
(1930) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy].
.
12. E.g., Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1977). See generally 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
At common law a woman's capacity to hold or receive title to property
was not destroyed by marriage, but marriage had important consequen-
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married women from asserting their rights as individuals, rights
separate from those shared with their husbands.
Maryland, like most states, has long followed the traditional
common law rule that a wife could not bring an action in law
against her husbandP Historically, this doctrine of interspousal
immunity developed from the common law theory that during
marriage the legal existence of the wife was merged into that of the
husband, thereby creating a single "unity."14 A married woman
could sue and be sued only by joining her husband. Suits between
spouses were barred for lack of capacity because such actions would
have placed each of the parties in the dual role of both plaintiff and
defendant. 15
Throughout the development of case law on interspousal tort
immunity, several theories have been advanced in support of the
common law doctrine. Originally, interspousal immunity was based
on ancient concepts of public policy favoring preservation of peace
and harmony in the home,ls and that rationale was most frequently
applied by the courts to justify the immunity. This concern was the
earliest justification for interspousal immunity in Maryland l7 and

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

ces. It gave a man a right to use and enjoy whatever property his wife
owned at the time of marriage or acquired during coverture. A husband
acquired a right to possess his wife's real estate and to enjoy the rents
and profits thereof, but the fee remained in the wife . . . . In view of the
perishable nature of chattels, and the common law denial of estates
therein, his right to use these involved such complete dominion as to
amount to ownership, and consequently marriage was said to give him
the legal title by operation of law.
McCurdy, supra note 11, at 1031-32 (footnote omitted).
The first Maryland case exemplifying this doctrine was Barton v. Barton, 32 Md.
214 (1870). In Barton, a wife's suit for the recovery of money loaned by her to her
husband prior to the marriage was denied by the court. Later Maryland cases
extended the doctrine of interspousal immunity for acts occurring during the
marriage as well. E.g., Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534
(1927). Due to the complexity and possible variations of interspousal tort suits
regarding acts committed prior to marriage versus those occurring during
marriage, and those involving actions by married spouses versus divorced
spouses, a comprehensive analysis of these facets of interspousal immunity is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Farage, Recovery For Torts Between
Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290, 292-94 (1934).
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1910). See generally 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-43; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 859 ("Any
tort action between husband and wife encountered at the outset the common law
doctrine of the legal identity of the two. It has been said ... that at common law
husband and wife were one person, and that person was the husband . . . . ").
See, e.g., Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876). See generally HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 11, at 643; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 860; McCurdy, supra note 11, at
1032.
E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611,617 (1910); Patenaude v. Patenaude,
195 Minn. 523, 526, 263 N.W. 546,547-48 (1935). See generally Note, Litigation
Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1650, 1650-54 (1966).
Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214,224 (1870).
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courts continued to apply it in denying an injured spouse access to
the civil courts. Another theory advanced to uphold interspousal tort
immunity was the strong possibility of collusion due to the
confidential relationship between husband and wife,18 which could
lead to the filing of spurious claims, particularly when one or both
spouses carried liability insurance. 19 Finally, some courts, concluding that criminal and divorce laws provide sufficient redress to an
injured spouse,20 have emphasized that adequate alternative legal
remedies are available.

B. Married Women's Acts
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, economic and social
progress led to the enactment of Married Women's Property Acts. 21
The primary purpose of those statutes was to secure to a married
woman a separate legal identity as well as a separate legal estate. 22
Ultimately, Married Women's Acts were passed in every jurisdiction. 23
Courts have been confronted with the question of whether the
Acts gave a married woman standing to bring an interspousal tort
suit. More specifically, the issue has been whether the married
woman's separate legal identity, established by the statute, had the
effect of modifying the common law immunity, or merely allowed a
wife to sue third parties in her own name without joining her
husband. 24 Only a few statutes specifically addressed the issue of the
married woman's right to bring a tort action against her husband. 25

18. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 310, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955). In Smith, the
court stated that the confidential relationship between husband and wife
increases the probability of fraud and collusion. See generally PROSSER, supra
note 11, at 863.
19. E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969)
(allowing interspousal tort claims when family member is insured creates strong
temptation to file spurious claims).
20. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910) (divorce adequate remedy);
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877) (interspousal tort actions are
unnecessary where criminal and divorce laws exist). Contra, Freehe v. Freehe, 81
Wash. 2d 183, 187-88,500 P.2d 771, 774-75 (1972) (criminal and divorce laws do
not adequately compensate for negligence).
21. A thorough classification of the Acts can be found in McCurdy, Personal Injury
Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 308-13 (1959).
22. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
23. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 310
(1959).
24. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 46, 89 A. 889, 891 (1914).
25. An example of a statute employing specific prohibitory language can be found in
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1973), which provides that "[a] married woman may,
in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with her, to the same
extent as if she were unmarried; provided that neither husband nor wife may sue
the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture." Other statutes
that deal specifically with interspousal tort suits are considered in McCurdy,
supra note 21, at 312-13.
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In most jurisdictions the legislative intent was difficult to ascertain
because the statutes did not refer to the immunity doctrine in precise
terms. 26 Therefore, the impact of the Acts varied from state to state.
In 1910, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Thompson
interpreted the District of Columbia's Married Women's Acts, and
held that a wife could not sue her husband in tort for assault and
battery.27 The Court based its decision on statutory construction as
well as policy considerations of public welfare and domestic
harmony.28 In refusing to construe the statute to allow a wife a cause
of action against her husband, the Court determined that if the
legislative intent had been to effect such "radical and far-reaching
changes"29 in the policy of the common law, clear and specific
language in the Act would have been employed to indicate such a
purpose. 30 Justice Day concluded that "[t]he statute was not intended
to give a right of action as against the husband, but to. allow the
wife, in her own name, to maintain actions of tort which at common
law must be brought in the joint names of herself and husband."31
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan, joined by Justices
Hughes and Holmes, criticized the ruling on the ground that the
statute on its face empowered married women "to sue separately. . .
for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were
unmarried."32 The dissenters concluded, therefore, that the legislative intent of the statute was to give a wife the right to sue her
husband in tort and thus the majority's holding was in opposition to
the plain meaning of the language of the statute.
Until recently, a majority of state courts followed the Thompson
decision and continued to apply common law justifications to uphold
interspousal immunity.33 In most states, the courts concluded that
the creation of a woman's separate legal identity without more was
not enough to abrogate the immunity.34 Statutes which destroyed the
marital unity but did not express a clear legislative mandate
addressing the married woman's right to bring tort actions against
their husbands were generally strictly construed. Such statutes, like

26. E.g., Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962), overruling
Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366,
173 N.W.2d 416 (1969), overruling Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047
(1906).
27. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
28. Id. at 616-18.
29. Id. at 618.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 617.
32. Id. at 620 (emphasis in original) (citing D.C. CODE § 1155 (1901)).
33. E.g., Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 253, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Austin v.
Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924).
34. E.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906); Austin v.
Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 71, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924).

1979]

Lusby v. Lusby

589

the District of Columbia Acts considered in Thompson, merely
provided that married women could sue for torts committed against
them as if they were unmarried. The courts reasoned that a change
in the established common law rule could be effected only through
clear and precise statutory language. 35 Consequently, state courts
concluded that while the statutes generally gave women the right to
bring tort actions for wrongs committed against them, interspousal
tort suits remained barred.
The dissent in Thompson 36 and the critical views of legal
commentators,37 however, have provided an impetus for a change in
the common law. The recent trend in an increasing number of
jurisdictions has been to rely on the Married Women's Acts to
abrogate interspousal immunity.3s Employing a liberal construction
of the statutes, some courts have determined that giving the wife a
separate legal identity had the effect of allowing tort actions
between spouses. 39 Other courts have concluded that where the
statute did not specifically address the issue of interspousal
immunity, the legislature had intended that the court retain the
power to modify the common law rule. 40 Legislatures in a few
jurisdictions have provided specific statutory authorization for
interspousal tort suits.41

35. E.g" Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935). The court strictly

36.
37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

construed W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19 (1931) and upheld interspousal tort immunity.
The pertinent part of the statute states: "A married woman may sue or be sued
alone in any court in this State that may have jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the same in all cases as if she were a single woman .... " Id. at 190, 179 S.E. at
605-06. See note 38 infra for the case overruling Poling u. Poling.
218 U.S. 611, 620-24.
See generally Greenstone, Abolition of Intrafamilial Immunity, 7 FORUM 82
(1972); Sanford, Personal Torts within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956).
In view of the paucity of authority, the unsatisfactory and
inconsistent character of the reasons advanced, the different and
inconsistent treatment of husband and wife and parent and child, in
several instances by the same court, and the changed economic
conditions of the present day, the problem of a cause of action for
personal injury should be considered an open question, meriting a more
careful and exhaustive analysis, a more critical appreciation of the
factors involved, and a more rational treatment than it has received in
the past.
McCurdy, supra note 11, at 1082.
E.g., Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978). The court
overruled Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935), and reinterpreted
W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19 to permit tort actions between spouses. The Coffindaffer
court attributed its reinterpretation of the statute to "the fact that the conditions
of society [had] changed." Id. at 342.
Id.
E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). "The failure of
the legislature more completely to respond to the ... invitation ... does not so
much indicate the legislature's indifference to the issue as it does its preference
that this court should itself resolve the issue." Id. at 370, 173 N. W.2d at 418-19.
See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §3-313 (McKinney 1964).
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Maryland's Married Women's Acts, enacted in 1898, completely
revised the rights of women but did not state whether the General
Assembly intended to give women the right to sue their husbands in
tort.42 The 1898 enactment gave married women the right to hold
and convey property, to engage in business, to contract, to sue and
be sued upon their contracts, and "to sue ... for torts committed
against them, as fully as if they were unmarried."43
The statute did not mention the husband until two years later
when the General Assembly added another provision to the Act,
which, unlike the 1898 law, contained clear and precise language
abrogating the doctrine of interspousal immunity in contract suits.
That provision specifically authorized a married woman to "contract
with her husband, and ... form a copartnership with her husband,
or with any other person . . . in the same manner as if she were a
femme sole, and upon all such contracts. . . sue and be sued as fully
as if she were a femme sole."44 In the area of interspousal tort
immunity, however, the intent of the legislature has not been further
defined by statute. Until Lusby, strict judicial interpretation of the
Married Women's Acts in Maryland precluded women from recovering in tort for personal injuries caused by their husbands.
III. HOLDING AND ANALYSIS OF LUSBY
In reviewing the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity,
the court of appeals in Lusby did not consider statutory construction of the Married Women's Acts or prior cases in Maryland as
dispositive of its holding. Instead, the court approached Lusby as a
case of first impression. The opinion traced the historical development of interspousal immunity through Maryland case law, and
Judge Smith factually distinguished Lusby from prior decisions
based on the type of tortious conduct involved. Cases previously
decided in Maryland involved interspousal suits brought by women
for personal injuries resulting from their husband's negligence,45 or
suits against the husband's employer 46 or some third party allegedly
responsible for the husband's negligent acts. 47 Other cases dealt

42. Law of April 9, 1898, ch. 457, § 5 (now codified and amended as MD. ANN. CODE
art. 45, § 5 (1971 & Supp. 1978».
43.Id.
44. Law of April 10, 1900, ch. 633, § 1 (now codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 20
(1971».
45. E.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961) (husband's negligent
operation of automobile prior to marriage resulted in wife's injuries); Furstenberg
v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927) (husband's negligent operation of
automobile during marriage resulted in wife's injuries).
46. E.g., Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940) (husband's
negligence while acting in the scope of employment resulted in wife's injuries).
47. E.g., David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932) (wife sued owners of a
business in which husband was a partner).
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strictly with property interests. 48 None ofthe earlier Maryland cases,
however, involved allegations of outrageous intentional torts, as in
Lusby.
A. The Cases in Maryland Prior to Lusby
A line of Maryland cases beginning with Furstenberg u.
Furstenberg49 consistently followed the Supreme Court's decision in
Thompson 50 and strictly construed the Married Women's Acts to
deny a wife the right to bring an action in tort against her
husband,51 or his employer52 for personal injuries allegedly resulting
from the husband's negligence. Relief was denied in negligence
actions even where the cause of action arose prior to marriage. 53 The
courts, quoting generously from Thompson, concluded that an intent
to create personal causes of action between husband and wife was
not expressed by the terms of the statute. 54 The legislature, the court
reasoned, could have provided specific language in the 1898 Act
giving women an express power to sue their husbands in tort. In
contrast, the courts noted that the provision enacted in 1900 clearly
and unequivocally expressed the legislative intent to give the wife a
right to bring a contract suit against her husband or any other third
party. 55 The consensus of opinion in cases prior to Lusby was that a
change in the common law rule of interspousal immunity in tort
actions, as in contract actions, should originate in the legislature.

B.

The Court's Rationale

The court of appeals quoted Blackstone as authority on the
rights of married persons at common law: "[T]he husband ... by
the old law, might give his wife moderate correction ... [b]ut this
power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds, and the
husband was prohibited from using any violence to his wife ...."56
Under the common law, therefore, a husband did not have a right to
commit a violent assault and battery on his wife.
In an effort to achieve a just result without violating principles
of stare decisis, the Lusby court did not ascribe its reasoning to a
necessary modification of the common law nor did the court disturb

48. E.g., Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957) (wife sued
husband in replevin for recovery of chattels).
49. 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
50. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
51. See note 45 supra.
52. See note 46 supra.
53. Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961).
54. E.g., Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 249-51, 136 A. 534, 534-36 (1927).
55. Id. at 252, 136 A. at 535-36.
56. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444, cited in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334,
338-39. 390 A.2d 77, 79 (1978).
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prior cases strictly construing the Married Women's Acts. Instead,
the court determined that the common law did not bar an action by a
wife against her husband for an outrageous intentional tort. 57
Noting Blackstone and acknowledging that all prior cases were
distinguishable inasmuch as they did not deal with intentional torts,
the court concluded that "nothing in our prior cases or elsewhere. . .
indicate[s] that under the common law of Maryland a wife was not
permitted to recover from her husband in tort when she alleged and
proved the type of outrageous intentional conduct here alleged."58
The court held, therefore, that "[t]he type of action in the case at bar
... [was] not ... forbidden by the common law of this State."59
Relying on the outrageous nature of the tort in Lusby as the
basis for its holding, the court of appeals circumvented a long
recognized common law disability incident to marriage, which
forbids tort suits between spouses. Although under the common law
a husband had no right to commit a violent assault and battery
upon his wife,so an injured wife could not recover in tort and was
limited either to bringing a criminal action or obtaining a divorce in
equity.61 Concededly, none of the prior Maryland cases that applied
the immunity doctrine involved intentional tort actions, and
therefore are distinguishable. Earlier Maryland decisions, however,
defined the scope of the immunity rule as including all torts between
spouses. The rule consistently applied in many of those cases was
not limited to negligence actions, but was stated as a general
principle of common law that "a wife could not maintain an action
against her husband for a personal tort."62 In Tobin v. Hoffman,
Chief Judge Sobeloff succinctly expressed the consensus of judicial
opinion in this state prior to Lusby when he said for the court: "It is
clear that Maryland will not entertain a suit by one spouse against
the other for his or her tort, committed during the marital status."63
IV. SCOPE OF FUTURE ABROGATION
Although the Lusby court joined the emerging majority of states
that have either modified or abolished the immunity between
spouses in tort actions, its abrogation of the interspousal immunity
was narrowly drawn. For instance: many courts that have departed
from the common law rule have allowed negligence actions between

57. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 358, 390 A.2d 77, 89 (1978).
58.Id.
59.Id.
60. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444-45.
61. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877). See generally PROSSER, supra note
11, at 862-63.
62. Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 521, 16 A.2d 99, 100 (1940).
63. 202 Md. 382, 391, 96 A.2d 597, 601 (1953).
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spouses as well as suits for intentional injuries. 64 Other states have
abrogated the interspousal immunity in actions arising out of motor
vehicle accidents 65 or suits involving intentional torts. 66 In some
jurisdictions where a departure from the immunity rule originated as
a limited exception in an assault and battery action,67 the
modification has been broadened in subsequent cases of negligence. 68 In one state where the court had previously abolished
interspousal immunity in cases of motor vehicle negligence torts,69
as well as cases of intentional torts,70 a recent case has extended the
abrogation to claims arising from domestic or household negligence.71
The court of appeals in Lusby carved out a narrow exception to
the doctrine of interspousal immunity in cases of outrageous
intentional torts. This decision, albeit a step forward in the
abrogation of the immunity, indicates the court's intention to
continue to limit access to the courts in civil actions between
spouses. In light of the erosion of the traditional public policy
justifications favoring tort immunity between spouses, Maryland's
limited exception should be extended to permit broader access to the
courts. The traditional justifications for interspousal immunity -

64. E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969).
65. E.g., Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Richard v. Richard, 131
Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973). See generally Note, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1214
(1976).
66. E.g., Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973) (husband intentionally
wounded wife with knife); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977) (husband
shot and killed wife). After discussing the origins of interspousal immunity and
prior Texas decisions following the old rule, the Texas court concluded:
Although most authorities recognize a distinction between a claim based
on a negligent act and one based on an intentional tort, all agree that
there is no sound basis for barring a suit for an intentional tort. We
concur and accordingly we abolish the rule ... to the extent that it
would bar all claims for willful or intentional torts.
Id. at 927.
67. Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (wife entitled to
recover damages from husband for broken arm resulting from husband's
intentional tort of assault and battery).
68. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (wife entitled
to recover damages for slip and fall on husband's boat if slippery condition was
caused by husband's negligence).
69. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (wife entitled to recover damages
from husband for injuries sustained while riding as a passenger in auto driven
neg)igently by husband).
70. Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974) (wrongful death action on
behalf of wife against husband who allegedly murdered wife was sustained by
court).
71. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978) (wife's index finger severed
as result of husband's negligent operation of hedge trimmer). In the companion
case, Mercado v. Mercado, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978), the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity was abrogated when the wife was severely burned as
a result of husband's negligence in using a flammable cement compound near a
gas stove.
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preservation of domestic harmony, the danger of collusive suits, and
the availability of alternative remedies - are no longer viable
reasons for upholding interspousal immunity or abrogating it only
in such limited circumstances.

A. Intentional Torts
There is ample justification for extending the holding in Lusby
to abrogate interspousal immunity in all intentional tort actions.
The Maryland court did not take full cognizance of the strong policy
reasons for modifying the immunity rule. Recent decisions in other
jurisdictions, however, have effectively negated the public policy
considerations previously advanced in support of the doctrine and
have emphasized that the needs of modern society dictate a more
radical change in the long-established common law rule.
In cases involving intentional torts, the preservation of the
marital relationship is not a sufficient justification to immunize a
spouse. Because of the brutal nature of the tort in Lusby, Judge
Smith noted that there was no domestic harmony left to be preserved
and, therefore, the risk of marital discord did not justify denying a
cause of action,72 for "[a]fter discord, suspicion and distrust have
entered the home, it is idle to say that one of the parties shall not be
allowed to sue the other because of fear of bringing in what is
already there."73 In all intentional tort cases involving personal
injuries to a spouse, however, both the tortious act and the filing of
suit reflect the unstable state of the marriage relationship.74 In a
recent Texas case involving an interspousal suit for an intentional
tort, the court concluded that "we do not believe that suits for willful
or intentional torts would disrupt domestic tranquility. The peace
and harmony of a home which has already been strained to the
point where an intentional physical attack could take place will not
be further impaired by allowing a suit to be brought to recover
damages for the attack."75
The danger of collusion in intentional tort suits between spouses
is remote. Because of the close relationship between husband and
wife, the possibility of collusion exists, but "courts have at their
command ample means to cope with the real or asserted spectre of
fraud in the context of marital tort claims."76 Moreover, insurers are
protected by well-established investigative practices 77 and criminal
sanctions for fraud. 77a It is extremely unlikely that a person would
72. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978).
73. Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 667, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952) (quoted in Lusby v.
Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 78 (1978».
74. E.g., Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
75. [d ..
76. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 554, 388 A.2d 951, 961 (1978).
77. Note, 11 SUFFOLK D.L. REV. 1214, 1223 n.62 (1976).
77a. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 233 (1979).
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submit voluntarily to serious bodily injury for the purpose of
collecting a money judgment. Furthermore, there is generally no
insurance coverage for intentional injuries,78 and thus any monetary
recovery by either spouse would come from the couple's own assets.
Consequently, there is little incentive to bring fraudulent claims in
suits for intentional torts between spouses.
Previously, the immunity doctrine was upheld on the grounds
that other judicial remedies were available to an injured spouse. 79
More recent cases, however, have abolished the common law rule
partly on the basis of the inadequate relief afforded women under
the existing criminal and divorce laws. so Divorce and criminal
remedies, unlike tort remedies, do not provide compensatory
damages. 81 Alimony in divorce actions may be awarded, but the
nature of this type of recovery does not provide redress for physical
injuries. Therefore, in cases of intentional torts between husband
and wife, interspousal suits provide the most effective means of
judicial redress.
Several jurisdictions that have recently modified the doctrine of
interspousal immunity have looked to earlier cases abrogating the
analagous parental immunity doctrine to justify their departure
from common law precedent. 82 Many of the same policy considerations advanced in support of interspousal tort immunity were relied
on to deny a cause of action between parent and child. 83 Abrogation
of parental immunity has evolved more slowly than the abrogation
of interspousal immunity.84 In some states, however, cases allowing
tort suits between parent and child came first, and their rationale
has been applied to permit subsequent interspousal tort actions. 85

78. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 699-700, 376 P.2d 70, 75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 107
(1962).
'
79. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
80. Id.
81. The issue was addressed by the court in Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601,506 P.2d
345 (1973), in the context of an interspousal suit resulting from an intentional
tort. After stating the common justification that the injured spouse has an
adequate remedy through the criminal and divorce laws, the court concluded
that,
Defendant has been convicted of a crime; the parties are now divorced.
The criminal action enforced society's prohibition against defendant's
conduct; it did not purport to remedy the wrong done to the victim of the
crime. Divorce actions, which are statutory, do not purport to provide a
remedy for personal injuries. Neither the criminal law nor the divorce
action provide a remedy to plaintiff for the results of the knifing; a
knifing which violated the wife's right to personal security.
Id. at 603, 506 P.2d 347.
82. E.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 371,173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Apitz v.
Dames, 205 Or. 242, 270, 287 P.2d 585, 598 (1955).
83. See generally PROSSER, supra note 11, at 865-66.
84. Id. at 866.
85. See cases cited at note 82 supra.
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In Lusby, Judge Smith cited the leading Maryland case of
Mahnke v. Moore,86 which allowed a tort suit by a child against her
father for "malicious and wanton wrongs."87 The Mahnke court
stated that the parental immunity doctrine did not apply in cases
where the parent's "acts ... show complete abandonment of the
parental relation . . . . "88 The facts in Mahnke, like those in Lusby,
involved conduct of an extremely outrageous nature. 89 Mahnke's
rationale, however, is easily applied to most intentional tort suits
between parent and child or husband and wife. The immunity which
arises by virtue of the relationship of the parties should not provide
protection from liability where the tortious conduct of either party
exhibits a renouncement of the family alliance.

B. Beyond Intentional Torts
Future abrogation of interspousal immunity in tort suits for
negligence will pose difficult problems for the Maryland courts.
Unlike the area of intentional torts, the immunity between spouses
for negligence has been firmly established by prior cases. 90 The strict
statutory construction of the Married Women's Acts in previous
interspousal suits involving negligence was not disturbed by the
Lusby holding.
Although in prior cases, the Maryland court consistently applied
strict statutory construction to the Married Women's Acts to uphold
interspousal immunity, the court in Lusby did not rely on the statute
as a basis for Maryland's partial abrogation of the common law
doctrine. In this respect Maryland differs from the majority of
jurisdictions that have relied, at least in part, on the Married
Women's Acts for their initial abrogation of the immunity.
Curiously, the Lusby court discussed at great length prior Maryland
decisions strictly interpreting the statute and emphasizing the
necessity of an express legislative mandate to broaden the Acts to
include suits between spouses. Moreover, Judge Smith recognized the
alternative of reinterpreting the Married Women's Acts to permit tort
actions between. spouses 91 and acknowledged the possible applicabil86. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
87. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.
88.Id.
89. In the child's presence, the father killed the mother with a shotgun. He kept the
child with the dead body for six days and subsequently committed suicide in the
child's presence.
90. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
91. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). Judge- Smith stated:
Insofar as the interpretation to be given to the present statute is
concerned, we have said many times that the cardinal rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent, and
in ascertaining that intent the court considers the language of an
enactment in its natural and ordinary signification.
Id. at 357, 390. A.2d at 88.
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ity of the dissenting opinion in Thompson. 92 The court, however,
refused to incorporate statutory interpretation into its decision. 93
By refusing to base its decision on statutory interpretation of the
Married Women's Acts, the court of appeals in Lusby made further
abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity more difficult.
The abrogation of the common law immunity in Lusby cannot be
extended beyond the area of intentional torts without overruling
prior cases. Therefore, the Maryland courts will probably await a
legislative mandate before allowing interspousal tort suits for
negligence.
V. CONCLUSION
With the court of appeals' decision in Lusby v. Lusby, Maryland
joins the modern trend toward a departure from the common law
doctrine of interspousal immunity. In most jurisdictions, the lack of
any sound public policy for retaining the interspousal immunity
doctrine has led the state courts to significantly modify or abolish
the common law rule. The narrow holding in Lusby, however, limits
the scope of tort liability between spouses to cases of outrageous
intentional torts. Moreover, the court's distinction based upon the
nature of the tort and Judge Smith's refusal to rely on statutory
construction of the Married Women's Acts create problems for
further judicial abrogation of interspousal immunity. No prior
Maryland cases, however, have dealt with suits between spouses for
intentional torts that are not "outrageous," and therefore courts in
the future can allow actions for intentional torts that are less than
"outrageous" without disturbing precedent. 94
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92. [d. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
93. The court did not explain why it was unnecessary to apply statutory construction
in this case. [d. at 357-58, 390 A.2d at 89.
94. In fact, House Bill No. 653, which was introduced in the Maryland House of
Delegates during the 1979 legislative session, attempted to abrogate. further the
interspousal immunity doctrine. This bill would have added to MD. ANN. CODE
art. 45, § 6 the following:
A married person may sue his or her spouse for an intentional tort
committed against such person as fully as if the parties were unmarried.
The bill received an unfavorable committee report, however, and was not
enacted.

